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BROWN AS ICON
STEVEN L. WINTERt
What becomes a legend most? Some readers may remember the
renowned Blackglama advertising campaign in which legendary, but aging
pop culture figures such as Sophia Loren, Elizabeth Taylor, Audrey
Hepburn, Diana Ross, Lena Home, even Lillian Hellman appeared in an
elegant black mink coat-sometimes with just the hint of bare shoulder or
bosom. For those too young to have seen these famous ads, fear not: The
company has relaunched the campaign. Only this time, the ads feature
various supermodels. For 2002, it was the Brazilian supermodel Gisele who,
according to the website, is "clearly a fashion icon." For 2004, it is Cindy
Crawford who--again, according to the website--"embodies everything
that Blackglama looks for in a legend."1
While I have heard of Cindy Crawford, I was pretty sure I had never
heard of Gisele. As you might well imagine, this piqued my curiosity: How
does someone or something get to be an "icon"? (I put aside for the
moment the question of what it means to be "clearly" an icon. Can there be
unclear or indistinct icons? Is a fuzzy icon anything like fuzzy math?). Icon
is from the Greek eikon, which means image, picture, or representation.2
In religious art, an icon is an artistic representation of something considered
holy or divine.3 In art history, iconography or iconology is the study of the
conventional meanings of the iconic representations used to convey some
doctrine or traditional story-typically some saint portrayed in a cathedral
window, but also in paintings by relatively more modem masters such as
Vermeer.4 The term iconography is also used to refer to the archetypical
scenes, characters, or images used in literary works such as novels or
I Walter S. Gibbs Professor of Constitutional Law and Director, Center for Legal
Studies, Wayne State University Law School. B.A. 1974, Yeshiva University; J.D. 1977,
Columbia. Copyright 2004 by Steven L. Winter. From 1978 to 1986, Professor Winter
served as an Assistant Counsel for the NAACP Legal Defense & Educational Fund, Inc.
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2. VII THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 608-10 (2d ed. 1989) (hereinafter "OED");
THE RANDOM HOUSE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 949 (2d ed. unabridged
1987) (hereinafter "RANDOM HOUSE").
3. OED at 608, definition 2; RANDOM HOUSE at 949, definition 2.
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films.,
Now, you may be wondering what supermodels, religious symbols, and
literary tropes have to do with the Supreme Court decision whose fiftieth
anniversary we mark this year. Everything. If Brown v. Board of
Education6 possesses the classic beauty and elegance of a Sophia Loren,
then the constitutional analog of the tawdry sexuality of this year's girl
Gisele is represented by such cases as Bob Jones University v. United
States7 and Batson v. Kentucky in which the Court reaffirmed the
preeminence of the rule against racial discrimination and in the very next
breath made it all but impossible to enforce.
Bob Jones involved a private religious college that maintained a rule
requiring the expulsion of any students who either dated "outside of their
own race" or spoke in favor of interracial dating. 9 The Court held that
private schools which discriminate do not qualify as charitable organizations
within the meaning of section 501(c) of the Internal Revenue Code and,
thus, are not eligible for tax deductible charitable contributions under section
170(a) of the Code. 10 The Court declared that:
Over the past quarter of a century, every pronouncement of this
Court and myriad Acts of Congress and Executive Orders attest a
firm national policy to prohibit racial segregation and discrimination
in public education. An unbroken line of cases following Brown v.
Board of Education establishes beyond doubt this Court's view
that racial discrimination in education violates a most fundamental
national public policy, as well as rights of individuals."
Although the Court's holding in Bob Jones sounds like a strong
reaffirmation of Brown and a blow for racial equality, the truth is more
5. Id.
6. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
7. 461 U.S. 574 (1983).
8. 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
9. Bob Jones, 461 U.S. at 581.
10. Id. at 595 ("Given the stress and anguish of the history of efforts to escape from
the shackles of the 'separate but equal' doctrine ... , it cannot be said that educational
institutions that, for whatever reasons, practice racial discrimination, . . . should be
encouraged by having all taxpayers share in their support by way of special tax status.").
11. Id. at 593.
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complicated. For the very next year in Allen v. Wright, 2 the Court pulled
all the teeth out of the Bob Jones ruling by holding that no one, in effect,
had standing to challenge IRS policies that allowed tax deductible status for
501(c) organizations without making any meaningful inquiry into whether
they were in fact discriminating. 3
In Batson, the Court held that prosecutors could not exercise their
peremptory challenges to strike potential jurors "solely on account of their
race or on the assumption that black jurors as a group will be unable impar-
tially to consider the State's case against a black defendant."' 4 The Court
specifically overruled its prior decision in Swain v. Alabama,'" which had
required defendants to show that prosecutors had used their peremptory
challenges in a discriminatory manner "in case after case, whatever the
circumstances, whatever the crime and whoever the defendant or the victim
may be."' 6 Because this "crippling" burden of proof had virtually immunized
prosecutors' use of peremptory challenges, 7 the Batson Court held that a
defendant could make a prima facie case of purposeful discrimination in the
exercise of peremptory challenges solely on the basis of the prosecutor's
actions in his or her case. ," Thus, a pattern of strikes exercised against
African American potential jurors could give rise to an inference of
discrimination. At that point, however:
[T]he burden shifts to the State to come forward with a neutral
explanation for challenging black jurors. Though this requirement
12.468 U.S. 737 (1984).
13. The Court held that even those who had suffered personal injury did not have
standing because their injuries could not fairly be traced to the government's conduct in
failing to assess more effectively the actual policies of organizations claiming charitable
status under §501(c). Id. at 757-61. Ironically, it was only the injunction issued by the D.C.
Circuit in the pending case in Allen that saved Bob Jones from being mooted by the
government's change of position. Bob Jones, 461 U.S. at 585 n.9.
14. Batson, 476 U.S. at 89. Batson has since been extended tocases in involving white
defendants, Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400 (1991), civil suits, Edmonson v. Leesville
Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614 (1991), use of peremptory challenges by defense counsel,
Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42 (1992), and peremptory strikes based on gender, J.E.B.
v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127 (1994).
15. 380 U.S. 202 (1965).
16. Id. at 223.
17. Batson, 476 U.S. at 92-93.
18. Id. at 95.
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imposes a limitation in some cases on the full peremptory character
of the historic challenge, we emphasize that the prosecutor's expla-
nation need not rise to the level justifying exercise of a challenge
for cause. 9
The prosecutor, in other words, could defeat the inference of discriminatory
intent merely by pointing to the potential juror's demeanor or her equivocal
answer to a question-a rebuttal available in virtually any case.2"
If Brown is being celebrated this year at law schools and legal functions
across the land, it is because it has long since been transformed from a
productive precedent and robust rule of law to a revered relic and feel-good
icon that affirms our essential goodness in the face of a social fabric that is
racked by inequality and a greater gap between haves and have-nots than
at any time in the last thirty years.2 If Brown is the preeminent moment of
twentieth-century constitutional law, it has long since passed into the
pantheon of constitutional archetypes that include Marbury v. Madison,22
Dred Scott v. Sandford,23 Lochner v. New York,24 Wickard v. Filburn,25
and the "one person, one vote" ruling in the reapportionment cases,
Reynolds v. Sims26 and its predecessor, Baker v. Carr.27 Just as one can
19. Id. at 97.
20. The Court subsequently defined "a neutral explanation" as any facially valid
"explanation based on something other than the race of the juror." Hernandez v. New York,
500 U.S. 352 (1991) (plurality opinion). See also id. at 375 (O'Connor, J., concurring)
(Batson "does not require that the justification be unrelated to race. Batson requires only that
the prosecutor's reason for striking a juror not be the juror's race.") (emphasis in original).
The explanation found acceptable in Hernandez was that the prosecutor, who had striken
all three of the potential jurors with Spanish surnames, was not certain that these bilingual
jurors could put aside their own understanding of testimony offered in Spanish to accept the
official translation of the court interpreter. Id. at 60-63.
21. See, e.g., David Leonhardt, Time to Slay the Inequality Myth? Not So Fast, The New
York Times, Jan. 25, 2004, sec. 3, p.4, col. 1 ("the rich have done far better than others over
the past 20 years-as well as over the past 30, 40 or 50 years, according to government
statistics and the economists who study them.").
22. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
23. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857).
24. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
25. 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
26. 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
27. 369 U.S. 186 (1962) (holding that challenge to state reapportionment did not
present a nonjusticiable political question).
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most harshly condemn a constitutional decision by comparing it to
Lochner,28 one can gain moral and legal purchase for a constitutional
argument by tying it in some way (however tenuous) to the decision in
Brown.29
Brown's iconic status resides in the fact that it is imbued with cultural
meaning even as it has steadily been emptied of both legal meaning and
practical effect. Those familiar with my work know that socio-cultural
phenomena like this catch my interest.3" And, so, I asked myself: When,
exactly, did Brown become an icon? Perhaps it was in the mid-nineties
when the Supreme Court effectively drew to a close the era of school
desegration with its decisions in Oklahoma City Public Schools v.
Dowell,3 affirming a ruling that the Oklahoma City schools had made
sufficient progress to be declared unitary; Freeman v. Pitts,32 further
accelerating the time at which a federal district court could relinquish
supervision of a desegregation case; and Missouri v. Jenkins,33 limiting the
district court's authority to impose remedies for harms resulting from
segregation. Perhaps it was in the mid-seventies when the Supreme Court
drew the line against the expansion of the principle of equality in decisions
such as San Antonio School District v. Rodriguez,34 rejecting school
equalization; Milliken v. Bradley,35 rejecting interdistrict busing; and
Washington v. Davis,36 requiring proof of intent in order to make a case of
racial discrimination. Or perhaps it was already in 1955 when in Brown II
the Court decided that desegregation could proceed "with all deliberate
28. See, e.g., Cass Sunstein, Lochner's Legacy, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 873 (1987); John
Hart Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE L.J. 920,937-43
(1973) ("I do wish 'Wolf' hadn't been cried so often .... But at least crying 'Wolf!'
doesn't influence the wolves; crying 'Lochner!' may.").
29. See discussion infra text accompanying nn. 63-88.
30. See, e.g., Steven L. Winter, When Self-Governance Is a Game, 67 BROOKLYN L.
REV. 1171 (2002) (discussingthe effectiveness and social provenance of the "game" rhetoric
used by the Republican Party and it's supporters during the period followingthe November
2000 presidential election).
31. 498 U.S. 237 (1991).
32. 503 U.S. 467 (1992).
33. 515 U.S.70 (1995).
34. 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
35.418 U.S. 717 (1974).
36. 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
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speed.""
But, surely, this is both too early and too despondent. While Brown II
certainly set the tone for Brown 's later undoing, it was explicitly supplanted
in 1968 in Green v. County School Board,38 when, on behalf of the Court,
Justice Brennan insisted that local school boards in the South come up "with
a plan that promises realistically to work, and promises realistically to work
now."39 Three years later, in Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg,4" the
Court upheld the first busing order and, in Keyes v. Denver School District
in 1973,41 the first Northern school case which also resulted in court-
ordered busing to achieve desegregation. Clearly, 1973-when Keyes and
Rodriguez were both decided-was the watershed year. But it would be
another twenty years before the bell would toll for court-ordered
desegregation and, thus, for the legal import of Brown.
It was, rather, in the mid-eighties that Brown became an icon. It
happened not, I think, in a judicial decision, but rather in the Senate Judiciary
Committee hearing room when Robert Bork testified that Brown v. Board
of Education was "surely correct," and was one of "the Court's most
splendid vindications of human freedom." 2 Bork, as you may recall, had
been a staunch critic of the Warren Court.43 He had nonetheless undergone
a "confirmation conversion"' with respect to some of those decisions, most
37. Brown v. Board of Educ. of Topeka, 349 U.S. 294, 301 (1954).
38. 391 U.S. 430 (1968).
39. Id. at 439 (emphasis in original).
40. Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971).
41. Keyes v. School District No. 1, Denver, Colorado, 413 U.S. 189 (1973).
42. Stuart Taylor, Jr., The Bork Hearings; Bork Backs Away from His Stances on
Rights Issues, The New York Times, Sept. 17, 1987, sec. A, p. 1, col. 6.
43. See Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47
IND. L. J. 1 (1971).
44. See, e.g., Linda Greenhouse, The Bork Hearings; Senators Question the Sincerity
of Bork's New Views, The New York Times, Sept. 18, 1987, sec. A, p. 22, col. 1 ("Both
Senator Arlen Specter of Pennsylvania and Senator Patrick J. Leahy of Vermont, in
questioning Judge Bork on his views of the First Amendment's free speech guarantee, raised
the question of whether his current opinions were part of a 'confirmation conversion."');
Stuart Taylor, Jr., How Bork Recast Ideas In His Senate Testimony, The New York Times,
Sept. 21, 1987, sec. B, p. 14, col. 1 ("One of the most remarkable aspects of Judge Robert
H. Bork's five days of testimony last week was his recantation and qualification of some
controversial views he has stated, forcefully and repeatedly, in the past .... He even
softened somewhat his thunderous attacks on Supreme Court decisions recognizing rights
to abortion and sexual privacy and other rights not specifically enumerated in the
[Vol. 50:849
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particularly Griswold v. Connecticut"5 recognizing the constitutional right
of married couples to use contraception. Prior to that point, however,
Brown was virtually the only civil rights and civil liberties decision he had
not opposed. Although he stressed in the committee hearing his
"reverence" for Brown, he simultaneously questioned the companion
decision in Boiling v. Sharp.46 Bork testified that he had not thought of a
rationale that would support the Supreme Court's decision to desegregate
schools in the District of Columbia, which, as part of the Federal
Government, is not subject to the Equal Protection Clause.47 In much the
same vein, he criticized Justice Powell's opinion in Bakke's supporting
limited affirmative action for the purpose of achieving diversity.49 In other
words, even prior to his confirmation conversion, an outspoken conservative
such as Robert Bork understood that no one who was not prepared to pay
obeisance to Brown could possibly be confirmed to the Supreme Court.
This caused a slight problem for Associate Justice Rehnquist who was
shortly to be elevated to Chief. As a young man, Rehnquist clerked for
Supreme Court Justice Robert Jackson when the Brown cases were first
being considered. As a law clerk in 1952, he wrote a memorandum to the
Justice arguing that Plessy v. Ferguson" and its "separate but equal" rule
should be affirmed. When questioned about that memorandum during his
first confirmation hearing in 1971, he claimed that it had been prepared for
Jackson's use at the upcoming conference of the Justices and that the
views it expressed were Jackson's and not his own.51 Richard Klugler
subsequently debunked that claim in a long footnote in Simple Justice,52 his
Constitution.").
45. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
46. 347 U.S. 497 (1954).
47. Taylor, supra note 42.
48. University of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 269 (1978).
49. See LloydN. Cutler, Saving Bork From Both Friends and Enemies, The New York
Times, July 16, 1987, sec. A, p. 27, Col. 1.
50. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
51. RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE: THE HISTORY OF BROWN V. BOARD OF
EDUCATION AND BLACK AMERICA'S STRUGGLE FOR EQUALITY 605 (1975).
52. KLUGER, supra note 51, at 767-71 n.*. See also Bernard Schwartz, Chief Justice
Rehnquist, Justice Jackson and the Brown Case, 1988 SUP. CT. REv. 245, 250 ("Jackson
never expressed the view attributed to him by Rehnquist .... On the contrary, from the
beginning of the Brown decision process, Jackson indicated that he would support a
properly written decision striking down segregation."); John A. Jenkins, The Partisan, The
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widely acclaimed history of Brown and its companion cases. Amongst the
evidence inconsistent with that claim is a line in the memorandum
disparaging the Court's decisions protecting the First Amendment rights of
Jehovah's Witnesses-a line of cases that includes Jackson's eloquent 1943
decision in the second flag salute case53-and the testimony of Justice
Jackson's secretary, who rejected as "incredible" the suggestion that
Jackson would ever have asked a law clerk to prepare his remarks for
conference discussions. 4 Indeed, a subsequent search of Jackson's
Supreme Court papers by Dennis J. Hutchinson of the University of
Chicago Law School-"every box, every detail"--revealed no other
instance in which the Justic e had asked a law clerk to prepare such a
memorandum prior to the conference. 5
What the search did reveal, however, was another memorandum that
Rehnquist had written as a law clerk. In Terry v. Adams, 6 the Court looked
through form to substance and held that a whites-only, private political club
that effectively determined the candidates in Democratic primaries and
other countywide elections violated the Fifteenth Amendment. In his
memorandum, Rehnquist advised Justice Jackson:
The Constitution does not prevent the majority from banding
together, nor does it attaint success in the effort. It is about time the
Court faced the fact that the white people in the South don't like
the colored people; the Constitution restrains them from effecting
this dislike through state action, but it most assuredly did not appoint
the Court as a sociological watchdog to rear up every time private
discrimination raises its admittedly ugly head. To the extent that this
decision advances the frontier of state action and "social gain," it
pushes back the frontier of freedom of association and majority
rule.
5 7
Jackson, of course, shared no such sentiments. He joined Justice Clark's
New York Times, March 3, 1985, sec. 6, p. 28, col. 1.
53. West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943). See text
accompanying notes 80-81 infra.
54. KLUGER, supra note 51, at 768 n.*.
55. Jenkins, The Partisan, supra note 52.
56. 345 U.S. 461 (1953).
57. Jenkins, The Partisan, supra note 52.
[Vol. 50:849
BROWN AS ICON
concurring opinion. 8 Though the Court was split with respect to the
rationale, only Justice Minton dissented. 9
By the time of his confirmation as Chief Justice, Rehnquist had
accepted Brown as the law of the land, though he continued to insist that
"there was a perfectly reasonable argument the other way."" At those
confirmation hearings, he was questioned vigorously by Senator Biden
concerning his views at the time of his clerkship for Justice Jackson.
Rehnquist managed to side-step the question without answering it.6'
One of the tough things about being an icon-and this is, I think, as true
for Brown as it is for those gold-painted little wooden statues with the faces
of saints on them-is that, while an icon has powerful meaning, the meaning
it has is principally a projection and reflection of the believer. The meaning
of an icon is read into it. And that is exactly what has happened to Brown:
Judges and scholars have read into Brown all sorts of meanings that do not
particularly jibe with the elegance, the beauty, the moral force of Chief
Justice Warren's plain spoken opinion. Some of these have been limiting
meanings, as in the cases noted earlier and some others.61 Some have been
meanings that might be characterized as more extensive or, even, abstruse.
In a 1990 article entitled "If He Hollers Let Him Go: Regulating Racist
Speech on Campus," 3 Charles Lawrence argued that Brown serves as a
precedent supporting campus hate speech codes.
58. Terry, 345 U.S. at 477.
59. Id. at 484.
60. Jenkins, The Partisan, supra note 52. On the memorandum discovered by Professor
Hutchinson, Rehnquist demurred: "Whatever I wrote for Justice Jackson was obviously a
long time ago, and to kind of integrate it into something I'm telling you now, I find rather
difficult." Id.
61. Linda Greenhouse, Rare Grillingfor a Justice ofHigh Court, The New York Times,
July 31, 1986, sec. A, p. 14, col. 1 ("'Senator, I don't think I reached a conclusion,' he said.
'Law clerks don't have to vote.' 'Yes, but they surely think,' Senator Biden said. 'Yes, they
do,' was the reply. A moment of silence followed. 'I'll be darned,' Senator Biden said."').
62. See, e.g., Richmond v. J. A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 524 (1989) (Scalia, J.,
concurring) (adopting the principle that government must be color-blind and noting the
school cases as the exception where race conscious state action is permissible solely because
it "is necessary to eliminate their own maintenance of a system of unlawful racial
classification.").
63. Charles R. Lawrence, III, If He Hollers Let Him Go: Regulating Racist Speech on
Campus, 1990 DUKE L. J. 431 (1990).
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Brown held that segregation is unconstitutional not simply because
the physical separation of black and white children is bad or be-
cause resources were distributed unequally among black and white
schools. Brown held that segregated schools were unconstitutional
primarily because of the message segregation conveys.64
The argument is a clever, creative one. Still, whatever one thinks about the
constitutionality of hate speech codes on campus, it remains true that
Brown is a case about what the state may do and say with respect to race
and not a case about the regulation of individual speech on campus, in
school, or elsewhere. 65 Here, we have an example of the rhetorical strategy
to which I earlier referred in which one tries to gain moral and legal
purchase for a constitutional argument by tying it to the Brown decision.
Lawrence's argument is, at least, close to home in the sense that it is
an attempt to amplify Brown's central message of equal dignity and respect
for all persons.66 Bruce Ackerman, in contrast, has argued that Brown is
not the "prophetic utterance" idealized by so many of its admirers as it is the
product of the New Deal's affirmance of the activist, regulatory state and
the impact of that development on the egalitarian vision of Reconstruction.67
The fulcrum of this argument is a reading of Plessy v. Ferguson6" as
resting on two assumptions. First, Plessy drew a sharp distinction between
political equality, which was protected by the Fourteenth Amendment, and
social equality, which could not be enforced by the law.69 This assumption,
Ackerman points out, was undermined by the constitutional developments
that attended the New Deal: "Once the New Deal Court had authorized the
state's power to guarantee a retirement pension or a minimum wage,
[Plessy's] confident distinction between political and social equality was no
longer tenable."' Second, Plessy viewed the question of the meaning of
segregation as "'solely' a product of private 'choices'; the state simply has
64. Id. at 439 (emphasis in original).
65. Lawrence, however, does address the critique of the public/private distinction that
underlies the state action doctrine. Id. at 444-49.
66. See id. at 438 ("Brown can also be read more broadly to articulate a ... principle
of equal citizenship.").
67. BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS 140-50 (1991).
68. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
69. Id. at 544.
70. ACKERMAN, supra note 67, at 146.
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nothing to do with it."' Thus, where Plessy had cruelly suggested that
blacks had "chosen" to interpret Jim Crow as a statement of inferiority, the
lesson of the New Deal-as Ackerman sees it reflected in Brown-was
that this understanding was no longer tenable: "The New Deal Court
recognized the government as an active contributor to the process by which
groups made their 'choices' in American society." '
The obvious problem with this argument is that Brown had little or
nothing to say about the activist state and the role of the government in
establishing meaning. Ackerman is aware of this difficulty. He responds:
"What is a 'public school but a place where government employees
'educate' children into the 'truth' about social reality . . . ?"" For
Ackerman, the import of the New Deal was that public schools "were no
longer anomalous, but paradigmatic of the new promise of activist govern-
ment."'74 On Ackerman's reading, Warren's discussion of the role of public
education-its role as "the most important function of state and local
government," "the very foundation of good citizenship," and "the principal
instrument in awakening the child to cultural values"75-is transformed into
the use of the public school as a "compelling symbol of the modem
republic's activist commitment to the general welfare."'6
Ackerman's account of Brown is, to say the least, forced. In fact, the
only reference to the role of the state in the construction of meaning comes
when Chief Justice Warren quotes the lower court finding that: "The impact
[of segregation] is greater when it has the sanction of the law; for the policy
of separating the races is usually interpreted as denoting the inferiority of
the negro group." ' And, contrary to Ackerman's reading, this passage sug-
gests only that the state contributes by magnifying an already existing
psychological meaning.
71. Id. at 147 (discussing Plessy, 163 U.S. at 551).
72. Id. at 148.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Brown, 347 U.S. at 493.
76. ACKERMAN, supra note 67, at 149. In an earlier version of the argument, he
observed: "Just as one might use the history of the White House as a trope to express the
riseofthe Presidency, Warren used the history of public education to express the rise of the
activist welfare state in modern constitutional interpretation." Bruce Ackerman,
Constitutional Politics/Constitutional Law, 99 YALE L.J. 453, 540 (1999).
77. Brown, 347 U.S. at 494 (quoting lower court finding not published in opinion
below, Brown v. Board of Educ., 98 F. Supp. 797 (D. Kan. 1951)).
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Ackerman's reading, moreover, is premised on a claim that is far too
strong for the historical record to bear. The public school was hardly the
centerpiece of the New Deal; one is left to wonder at the claim that it "had
become emblematic of the New Deal's activist use of state power for the
general welfare." ' Additionally, it is hard to square Ackerman's revisionist
reading of Brown with the actual case law that followed the New Deal.
Recall that, for Ackerman, the public school exemplifies the activist state
because it is the institution authorized to induct children into its version of
social reality.79 But this was precisely the position rejected by Justice
Jackson writing for the New Deal Court in the second flag-salute case,
West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette.° "If there is any
fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is that no official, high or petty,
can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or
other matters of opinion or force citizens to confess by word or act their
faith therein."' l Indeed, as Justices Douglas and Black explained in their
concurring opinion, the New Dealers on the Court had come to see that the
power of the state could not be given the same leeway in matters of politics
and belief as it was now allowed in matters of economic policy.82
The worst thing about Ackerman's reading of Brown, however, is not
that he misreads it but that he fails to do it justice. For Ackerman, Warren's
opinion in Brown represents a "weak rhetorical performance." 3 But what
speaks to so many of us is precisely the forthrightness and unvarnished
elegance of Warren's prose:
- "[W]e cannot turn the clock back to 1868 when the Amendment
78. ACKERMAN, supra note 67, at 141.
79. See supra text accompanying note 76.
80. 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
81. Id. at 642. In fact, Barnette decisively rejected the Court's then-recent decision in
Minersville School District v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586 (1940), the first compulsory flag-salute
case. Justice Frankfurter's majority opinion in Gobitis had rested on the strong statist view
that the government was free to employ this means to promote good citizenship, inculcate
patriotism, and maintain national cohesion. Gobitis, 310 U.S. at 595-96.
82. Accounting for the change in their vote since Gobitis, they explained:
Reluctance to make the Federal Constitution a rigid bar against state regulation of
conduct thought inimical to the public welfare was the controlling influence which
moved us to consent to the Gobitis decision. Long reflection convinced us that
although the principle is sound, its application in the particular case was wrong.
Barnette, 319 U.S. at 643 (Black & Douglas, JJ., concurring).
83. ACKERMAN, supra note 67, at 142.
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was adopted, or even to 1896 when Plessy v. Ferguson was
written. We must consider public education in the light of its full
development and its present place in American life . .. .
- "To separate them ... solely because of their race generates a
feeling of inferiority as to their status in the community that may
affect their hearts and minds in a way unlikely ever to be
undone.""5
- "We conclude that in the field of public education the doctrine of
'separate but equal' has no place. Separate educational facilities
are inherently unequal.'*6
Warren had no trouble explaining what was wrong about Plessy's
reasoning: It was not that the Plessy Court missed the state's role in
establishing meaning; it was that it failed honestly to acknowledge that in
Jim Crow the state was speaking in socially and morally derogatory terms
by enacting into law the prejudice of its white majority. 7 Segregation
mandated by law was evil for the simple and obvious reason that "exclusion
is a primary form of humiliation, and humiliation is crippling-it does terrible
injury to people, it twists them, it deforms them, as every American minority
can attest and as the best American minority writers make clear in their
work."
So, what becomes a legend most? We could take that question two
ways. We could take it on the level-in which case the only answer that
would be becoming would be to rededicate ourselves and our law to making
real the promise of an egalitarian society that was first offered in the
Declaration of Independence, made part of the Constitution with the
adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment, and taken up in its generation by
Brown and the civil rights movement of the 1950s and 1960s. But we have
only to look at the city centers around us-not to mention our political
rhetoric and electoral campaigns-to see how far we stand from that
84. Brown, 347 U.S. at 492.
85. Id. at 494.
86. Id. at 495.
87. Indeed, the Plessy Court admitted as much when it asserted that the legislature "is
at liberty to act with reference to the established usages, customs and traditions of the
people." Plessy, 163 U.S. at 550.
88. Philip Roth, The StoryBehind "The Plot Against America," The New YorkTimes,
Sept. 19, 2004, sec. 7, p. 10. See also Charles Black, The Lawfulness of the Segregation
Decisions, 69 YALE L.J. 421 (1960).
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possibility. Or, we could take the question as ironic-in which case the
honest answer is that what becomes a legend is precisely that which makes
us feel virtuous, generous, attractive: Brown is revered as an icon not for
what it is or what it accomplished, but rather as a beautiful picture at which
we love to gaze and see reflected in it our better selves.
But I do not mean to suggest that all hope is lost. According to the
Blackglama site "all legends share a timelessness, a glamour, an endurance
that goes beyond what's current or merely in vogue." 9 Brown most
certainly fits that standard. Even in our most skeptical moments, we know
that Brown is a legend, a symbol, an emblem of truth and justice. If we
mourn the degree to which Brown has become an icon, we must
simultaneously celebrate it as a legend that-regardless of what transpires
around us-continues to speak to us in plaintive tones that importune us,
still, to rise to its challenge.
89. See supra note 1.
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